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In the recent financial crisis, macroeconomic stimuli produced mixed results across developed economies.
In contrast, China's stimulus boosted real GDP growth from an annualized 6.2% in the first quarter
of 2009 trough to 11.9% in the first quarter of 2010.  Amidst this phenomenal response, land auction
and house prices in major cities soared.  We argue that the speed and efficacy of China's stimulus derives
from state control over its banking system and corporate sector.  Beijing ordered state-owned banks
to lend, and they lent.  Beijing ordered centrally-controlled state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest,
and they invested.  However, our data show that much of this investment was highly leveraged purchases
of real estate.  Residential land auction prices in eight major cities rose about 100% in 2009, controlling
for quality variation.  Moreover, higher price rises occur these SOEs are more active buyers.  We argue
that these centrally-controlled SOEs overbid substantially, fueling a real estate bubble; and that China's
seemingly highly effective macroeconomic stimulus package may well have induced costly resource
misallocation.
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1.    Introduction 
The  2008  financial  crisis  that  originated  in  the  U.S.  triggered  a  global  recession.   
Central banks and governments worldwide reacted with monetary and fiscal policy 
interventions.    Researchers at the Brookings Institute estimate fiscal stimuli in the 
G-20 countries reaching US$692 billion in 2009 – roughly 1.4% of their combined 
2008 gross domestic product (GDP) and about 1.1% of global GDP (Prasad and Sorkin 
2009).    IMF  (International  Monetary  Fund  2009)  estimates  are  similar,  and  peg 
China's package at about 2% of its 2009 GDP. 
These government actions renewed debate about the efficacy of such stimuli 
as remedies for recession.    Feldstein (2009) sees credit markets in U.S. and some 
other developed countries as too deeply wounded by the subprime mortgage crisis 
to be able (or willing) to advance credit in response to interest rate reductions by 
monetary authorities.    If so, monetary stimulation alone ought not to work, even in 
the short-run.  When monetary policy's effectiveness is uncertain, fiscal stimuli – 
tax  cuts,  government  spending  hikes,  or  both  -  can  come  to  the  rescue  if  the 
Keynesian  multiplier  exceeds  one.    Christine  Romer,  the  chair  of  U.S.  President 
Obama's  Council  of  Economic  Advisers,  estimates  the  U.S.  stimulus  achieving  a 
multiplier of about 1.6,
1  but other prominent economists, such as Robert  Barro
2 
and John Cochrane
3, estimate a multiplier below one.   
                                                           
1  Christine Romer. "On the Advance Estimate of GDP for the Fourth Quarter of 2009," Jan 29, 2010. 
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/01/29/advance-estimate-gdp-fourth-quarter-2009. . 
2  Robert Barro, "The Stimulus Evidence One Year On," Wall Street Journal, Feb 23, 2010.   
3  John H. Cochrane, "Fiscal Stimulus, Fiscal Inflation, or Fiscal Fallacies?" Feb 27, 2009. 
faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/Papers/fiscal2.htm.    
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The  literature  provides  mixed  theoretical  and  empirical  evidence  on  the 
efficacy  of  stimulus  packages  in  developed  economies.  Early  empirical  work 
reports  multipliers  above  one  (Rotemberg  and  Woodford  1992;  Blandchard  and 
Perotti  2002;  Gali,  Lopez-Salido  and  Valles  2007),  but  more  recent  work  reports 
multipliers near or below unity, challenging the wisdom of all the recent government 
stimuli.    Barro and Redlick (2009) discount earlier multiplier estimates as biased 
because of business cycle endogeneity, and argue that a focus on defense spending 
allows a cleaner estimate – which turns out to be below one under most conditions.   
This accords with estimates by Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999), Burnside, 
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), and others.    Ramey (2009) estimates the multiplier 
as lying between 0.6 and 1.1, and criticizes larger estimates as biased due to model 
misspecification.    Freedman et al. (2009) show a wide range of short-run (two years) 
multipliers, ranging from 0.2 to 2.2 in the United States; but stress that government 
spending hikes almost always beget fiscal deficits and therefore reduce long run 
output.    The  efficacy  of  tax  cuts  is  also  uncertain.    Barro  and  Redlick  (2009) 
estimate that a one percentage point cut in the mean marginal tax rate raises the 
subsequent  year's  GDP  growth  rate  by  about  0.6%.    However,  Feldstein  (2009) 
estimates a much weaker response - a marginal propensity to consume from tax cuts 
of only 0.13.    Debates in other countries echo that in the U.S.       
The Chinese government's stimulus in the wake of the 2008 crisis wrought a 
large and almost immediate response.    Beijing announced its stimulus package in 
the 4
th quarter in 2008 and annualized real GDP growth rates in the four quarters of  
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2009 rose steadily and substantially: 6.2%, 7.9%, 9.1% and 10.7%, respectively; and 
11.9% in the first quarter of 2010.   
China's stimulus contained both monetary and fiscal elements.    In the 4
th 
quarter  of  2008,  the  government  announced  a  monetary  policy  shift  from 
"moderately tight" to "moderately loose".    The annualized real money supply (M2) 
growth rate rose from 14.9% in 2008 Q4 to 26.2% in 2009 Q1 and then 30.4% in 
2009 Q2, while the annualized real growth rate in total loan balances rose from 13.1% 
to  27.9%  and  then  33.9%  in  the  same  intervals  (Figure  1).    In  comparison,  the 
average  real  annual  growth  rates  in  M2  and  loan  balances  from  2000  to  2008 
averaged  14.5%  and  11.8%,  respectively.    The  fiscal  stimulus,  a  government 
spending package of RMB4 trillion (about US$586 billion) began in November 2008 
and was to be spent over the next two to three years.
4    Thereafter, the annualized 
real growth rate in fixed capital assets investment rose from 20.27% in 2008 Q4 to 
29.42% in 2009 Q1 and then 38.03% in 2009 Q2 (Figure 2).   Gross capital formation 
contributed over 90% (a historic peak) of China's GDP growth in 2009.
5 
===Insert Figure 1 about here=== 
===Insert Figure 2 about here=== 
                                                           
4  Actual spending by the Chinese central government may well be less than announced figures.    The 
official figure for 2009, announced in a March 2010 speech to the National Peoples' Congress by 
Premier Wen Jiaobao, is only RMB924.3 billion (ca US$135.4 billion).    Even this may be too high: 
Prasad and Sorkin (2009) estimate that the central government spent only US$90.1 billion that year. 
5  Source: National Bureau of Statistics, “2010 Statistics Yearbook of China”.    .  
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The  sheer  magnitudes  of  China's  stimulus  package  do  not  explain  its 
remarkable impact.    China's monetary policy was not distinctly extreme: its lowest 
benchmark interest rate during the downturn period was 2.25%, and this was not 
lower than in most other economies.    Prasad and Sorkin (2009) classify the fiscal 
stimulus packages of China, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the United States as 
"large"  compared  to  those  of  other  G20  countries;  but  estimate  America's  fiscal 
stimulus, US$841.2 billion or 5.9% of GDP, dwarfing China's comparatively paltry 
US$204.3 billion or 4.8% of GDP.    The IMF (2009) estimates are more comparable: 
4.8% and 4.4% of GDP for America's and China’s fiscal stimuli, respectively.    Thus 
China's  fiscal  stimulus  was  clearly  not  larger  than  America's,  and  was  probably 
somewhat smaller.         
China's economic strength coming out of the global recession is also clearly 
not  due  to  an  undervaluation  of  its  currency  stimulating  exports.    Despite  the 
recent debate over China's exchange rate policy, and irrespective of whether or not 
a low RMB subsidizes exports, Chinese net exports fell 44.8% in 2009.    The Chinese 
government estimates that this contracted the economy by roughly 3.9% of GDP.
6  
Thus, China's stimulus package took effect as the country 's exports were falling 
precipitously.         
We offer a new explanation of the effectiveness of China's stimulus package 
based on the corporate governance of its banks and major non-financial enterprises.  
Specifically, we propose that t he extraordinarily fast and large response to the 
                                                           
6  Source: National Bureau of Statistics, “2010 Statistics Yearbook of China”.      
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government's stimulus policies reflects the central government's direct control over 
major  banks  and  largest  non-financial  enterprises,  all  of  which  are  state-owned 
enterprises  (SOEs).    China's  SOE  banks  increased  lending  dramatically  and 
immediately  upon  the  government's  announcement  of  its  stimulus  policies,  and 
China's state-owned non-financial enterprises launched vast new investment plans 
at exactly the same time.   
We argue that these lending and investment decisions generally do not seek 
to  optimize  the  firm-level  financial  interests  of  China’s  banking  and  nonfinancial 
SOEs,  as  microeconomic  theory  posits  should  occur  in  a  market  economy.      
Rather,  they  reflect  direct  political  control  by  the  government  over  banks  and 
corporate borrowers.    If so, the speed and efficacy of China's stimulus policies may 
well be part of what is sometimes called the "policy burden" (Lin, Cai and Li, 1998; 
Lin and Tan, 1999; Lin and Li, 2008) or "multitasking" (Bai et al, 2000; Bai, Lu and Tao, 
2006) the government assigns to SOEs.    Such direct intervention in bank lending 
and corporate investment decisions may let China's government lift its economy out 
of a low-level equilibrium more neatly than other countries could manage.    But the 
drafting of banks and non-financial in a forced march towards higher GDP may also 
misallocate capital, inducing a recovery without lasting economic foundations. 
Major  lending  initiatives  require  substantial  due  diligence  and  financial 
analysis by banks, and major capital spending initiatives entail substantial planning 
and  preparation  by  enterprises.    This  requires  expertise,  time,  and  resources  – 
especially in a rapidly changing economic environment.    Ordered to boost lending,  
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China's SOE bank managers were understandably reluctant to lend to private-sector 
entrepreneurs,  and  so  proffered  loans  to  nonfinancial  SOEs,  whose  official 
connections substantially reduce their perceived default risk.     
Major capital investment outlays also require intricate cost-benefit studies, 
forecasts of important parameters like demand and factor costs, and risk analysis.   
This  too  requires  expertise,  time,  and  resources  –  especially  in  an  uncertain 
economic environment.    China's SOE managers, ordered to boost investment, were 
understandably  hesitant  to  make  intrinsically  largely  irreversible  investments  in 
property,  plant,  and  equipment.    Instead  they  needed  quick  and  reversible 
investments.    We  show  that  they  poured  the  proceeds  of  their  loans  from  SOE 
banks into real estate purchases, which count as corporate investments in official 
statistics. 
Consistent with this, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) of the State Council (federal government) reports numerous 
SOEs,  especially  very  large  SOEs  controlled  directly  by  the  central  government 
(hereinafter "C-SOEs"), suddenly expanding housing development activities in 2009.   
Using parcel-level land auction data, and adjusting for parcel quality using location 
and physical attribute data, we find a 97.4% increase in  real land prices in eight 
major Chinese cities in 2009.    The fraction of the total value of residential land 
purchases made by C-SOEs jumped from 15% prior to 2008 to 23% in 2009 and 33% 
in 2010 Q1.  We further estimate that, controlling for land parcel attributes and 
time fixed effects, C-SOEs paid 16% more than other land buyers.    Moreover, these  
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effects are evident after the government's stimulus package announcement, but not 
before.    These  findings  are  consistent  with  C-SOEs  overpaying  for  land  in  a 
scramble to invest quickly – though the bid premium associated with C-SOEs' may be 
partially attributable to lower capital costs, and might also be justifiable in that their 
political  connections  might  let  C-SOEs  glean  greater  revenue  from  development 
projects than other developers could.       
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.    The  next  section  summarizes  the 
institutional background of banks, most of which are SOEs, and nonfinancial SOEs in 
China, including various reforms and their current status.    Section 3 discusses the 
banks  and  SOEs'  rolethe  roles  of  banking  and  nonfinancial  SOEs  in  the  stimulus 
policies, and argues that an SOE channel is important to Chinese macroeconomic 
policy.    Section  4  introduces  the  land  transaction  data  for  empirical  tests,  and 
section 5 discusses our empirical results linking SOEs' bidding to real estate prices.   
Section 6 discusses the social and economic implications of SOEs' bidding behavior in 
land market.    Section 7 concludes.     
 
2.    Institutional  Background  Regarding  Chinese  Banks  and  Large 
Non-financial Enterprises 
2.1    Recent SOE Reform Policies   
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, or more precisely, since 
the  completion  of  its  "Socialist  Transformation"  in  1956,  SOEs'  domination  in  all  
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industrial sectors has been a key element of Socialism.    From 1956 until the recent 
reform era, industrial facilities were parts of various government ministries, and thus 
integral  parts  of  the  central,  provincial,  municipal,  or  local  district  governments.   
Managers were appointed government bureaucrats charged with following Central 
Plans  and  occasional  direct  orders  from  higher  levels  of  government  or  Party 
officials.
7  In 1978, when economic reforms began, SOEs accounted for 78% of total 
industrial  output  and  64%  of  urban  employment ,  and  d uring  1975-1980  SOEs 
accounted for over 84% of new investment in industrial fixed assets (Chiu and Lewis, 
2006; Brandt, Rawski and Sutton, 2008).
8   
After the mid-1980s, reforming SOEs became a major policy focus, and actual 
reforms  occurred  in  three phases.    We briefly review t he first two, which are 
discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g. Qian, 2000; Chiu and Lewis, 2006; Brandt, Rawski 
and Sutton, 2008).   Our focus is the third phase, which clarifies SOEs' role in the 
government stimulus packages. 
The  first  phase,  from  the  mid-1980s  to  the  mid-1990s,  expanded  SOE 
autonomy  and  surrounded  CEOs  with  incentives.    First, a "dual-track approach" 
(shuang gui zhi) let SOEs produce beyond their quotas, sell the excess at market 
prices, and keep the proceeds of this as corporate profits, while the government 
continued setting quotas.    Later, a "contract responsibility system" (cheng bao zhi) 
was introduced to most small- and medium-size SOEs, under which SOE managers 
signed  contracts  with  the  government.    These  gave  managers  considerable 
                                                           
7  For more details about SOEs during the planned economy era, see Chiu and Lewis (2006) and Brandt, 
Rawski and Sutton (2008).   
8  Most of the remaining was by local government-controlled collectives.     
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autonomy in running their SOEs, but the enterprises remained wholly owned by the 
State.    Profits were shared between the enterprises and the State according to the 
contracts.     
The second phase of SOE reforms started in 1994 and focused on ownership.   
Guided by the slogan "grasp the big, let go the small" (zhua da fang xiao), many 
small- and medium-size SOEs were assessed for reorganization, bankruptcy, debt 
write-offs,  merger  into  partnerships,  leasing,  contractual  operation,  or  sales.   
Larger  SOEs  remained  state-owned  as  a  shareholding  system  was  introduced.   
Some more profitable enterprises were even encouraged to list minority public floats 
on domestic or international stock exchanges.     
Despite SOEs, especially large ones, having privileged access to inputs, capital, 
and markets; many continued performing poorly at the end of the 20
th century – 
most likely because of a mixture of poor governance, under-developed management 
skills, and heavy "policy burdens" that commandeered SOEs to fulfill government 
policy agendas, distorting their production decisions and general operations (Lin and 
Tan, 1999; Lin and Li, 2008).    The central government billed the decade from 1993 
to  2002  as  "the  most  difficult  period  for  the  SOEs."
9  During  the  economic 
downturn of 1998, more than two thirds of  industrial SOEs ran deficits, and SOEs' 
country-wide mean  return on assets  (ROA)  was only  about  0.7%.
10  SOEs were 
called the "Achilles heel of China's otherwise remarkable economic performance " 
                                                           
9  Source: "Thirty Years of SOE Reform", http://www.gov.cn/ztzl/2008-10/02/content_1110911.htm.   
10  Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China.    
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(Broadman,  2001)  and  "threaten[ed]  to drag down  the  nation's  entire  economy" 
(Steinfeld, 1998). 
The third phase of SOE reforms started in 2003, after the November 2002 
16
th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).    This era is the focus 
of our study.    In this third phase, the government set about reforming property 
rights and corporate governance in large SOEs.    One key reform was the formation 
of a set of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commissions (SASACs) 
in March 2003 by the State Council of the People's Republic, China's analog of the 
Privy Council in a Westminster system of government.   
The powers and responsibilities of the SASACs were defined in a May 2003 
State  Council  document  entitled  "Interim  Provisions  on  Supervision  and 
Administration of State-owned Assets of Enterprises" (Decree 378, 2003), and an 
amended  version  of  which  became  the  2008  Law  on  State-owned  Assets  of 
Enterprises.    This assigned SASACs the legal liabilities and rights of investors holding 
SOE shares on behalf of the State and the responsibility of guiding and supervising 
further SOE reforms.     
As  Figure  3  shows,  the  State  Council  SASAC  is  a  ministry  of  the  central 
government in Beijing, and serves as a holding company for SOEs that were formerly 
part  of  the  central  government.    These  are  called  "central  SOEs"  (yang  qi), 
hereinafter C-SOEs.    At its founding in 2003, the State Council SASAC had charge 
over 196 C-SOEs.    Mergers over subsequent years reduced their number to 142 by 
the end of 2008, and 129 by the end of 2009.    The State Council SASAC is also  
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charged with guiding and supervising the regional-level SASACs, which control other 
SOEs  that  were  formerly  parts  of  provincial,  city,  or  district  governments:  "local 
SOEs" (di fang guo qi), hereinafter L-SOEs. 
===Insert Figure 3 about here=== 
The SASAC reforms "corporatized" SOEs into entities recognizable as joint 
stock companies, with shares bestowing ownership rights and governance structures 
regulated  by  Corporate  Law,  Securities  Law,  and  related  institutional  structures.   
These  so-called  "modern  enterprise  system"  (xian  dai  qi  ye  zhi  du)  reforms 
fundamentally changed SOEs in several ways.     
First,  the  SOEs  became  legal  entities  with  owners.    This  necessitated the 
clarification of the property rights of both the SOEs and their shareholders.    State 
assets  formerly  used by  several  SOEs  had to  be  assigned  to  one  SOE or  divided 
cleanly among more than one.    Because all shareholders in an SOE, including the 
SASACs, were thenceforth to have identical rights, the final ownership structure – 
the fractions of shares in each SOE owned by various ministries, government organs, 
and  levels  of  government  had  to  be  clarified  so  these  could  be  assigned  to  the 
corresponding  SASACs.    Thereafter,  a  firm  in  China  is  officially  classified  as 
state-owned or state-controlled only if the State, by dint of one and only one SASAC 
or parent SOE, is its sole owner or majority (over 50% of shares) owner.     
Second,  the  reforms  gave  SOE  managers  meaningful  autonomy  over 
day-to-day business decisions.    Before the SASAC reforms, all SOEs were integral  
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parts of national, provincial, or local governments.    By recasting SOEs into distinct 
entities,  the  reforms  severed  direct  bureaucratic  control  over  SOE  operations.   
Moreover, Premier Wen Jiabao promised at the founding of the State Council SASAC 
that  the  SASACs  would  not  become  SOEs'  "mothers-in-law"  (po  po)  –  a  term 
connoting overbearing meddling.   
Nonetheless, the SASACs equity blocks gave them strong control rights over 
SOEs, with which they were to fulfill their fourfold supervision and administration 
roles.    First,  the  SASACs  were  expected  to  affect  top  management  decisions  by 
using their equity blocks to control SOE boards.    Second, the SASACs, especially the 
State  Council  SASAC,  were  empowered  to  issue  regulations  and  documents  that 
SOEs had to obey regarding development strategies, investment decisions, budgets, 
audits,  risk  management  processes,  and  so  on.
11    Third,  the  SASACs  were 
empowered to  define, and redefine,  each  SOE's primary business activity.    SOE 
executives thus need prior SASAC approval for a shift in primary focus from one line 
of business to another,  though not to acquire  control of a subsidiary in another 
sector.  Finally and most importantly, top SOE executives  were thenceforth hired, 
renewed, and dismissed  by the SASACs,  though top appointments in  C-SOEs also 
required approval from  the Organization Department  of  the  Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP).   The top positions that also require Party approval include the chair of 
the board, chief executive officer (CEO), deputy CEO, and any other key position the 
CCP Organization Department  considers important.   Most recently,  the  "Interim 
                                                           
11  A 2008 State Council SASAC document entitled “Development of SASACs in the Past Five Years” 
reports that the State Council SASAC issued 19 regulations and 104 documents from 2003 to 2008, 
while local SASACs issued over 1,600 documents during that period.          
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Provisions on Management of Executives in C-SOEs", issued jointly by the Central 
Committee of CCP and the State Council in December, 2009, enshrines the principle 
of "absolute control of the executives by the Party" (dang guan gan bu).    Consistent 
with its incontestable control of the economy's "commanding heights," the Party 
thus  retains  direct  control  over  SOEs  by  dint  of  directly  controlling  their  top 
executives' careers. 
This leads directly into the third important feature of the new system: SASACs 
control over SOE top executives' incentives.    The State Council assigns SASACs the 
responsibility  to  "evaluate  the  executives  of  the  enterprises  through  legal 
procedures, and grant rewards or punishments according to their performance."
12   
The  SASACs  consider  this  one of  the ir  major  instruments  for  "improving"  SOE 
performance.   One of the first Documents the State Council SASAC issued after its 
2003  founding  was  the  "Interim  Provisions  on  Performance  Evaluations  for 
Executives of  C-SOEs."  Revised twice, in 2006 and  again in  2009, this Document 
mandates that State Council  SASAC  conducts  annual and  triennial  evaluations of 
C-SOE top executives for use in determining the executives' compensations.   
The Document divides an executive's compensation  into  a  "base salary", 
typically about one third of the total, and a "bonus", the remaining roughly two 
thirds.  Following the 2006 amendments, listed  C-SOEs could also grant their top 
executives shares as a third component of compensation, though few do so as yet.   
The  State Council SASAC r eports the average  annual  salary, including  both  base 
                                                           
12  Source:  "Interim  Provisions  on  Supervision  and  Administration  of  State-owned  Assets  of 
Enterprises" (State Council’s Decree 378, 2003).    
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salary and bonus, of C-SOE CEOs rising from RMB 350,000 in 2004 to about RMB 
600,000 in 2009, a level considerably above that of top ministry-level civil servants in 
the central government.
13   
In theory, this  directly links  the income of an SOE 's top  executives  to  its 
performance.   The SASAC assigns the executive a grade, with A the highest  and E 
the lowest, in his SASAC annual evaluation.  An A  means a triple bonus, while an E 
means no bonus at all.    Sixty percent of the bonus is paid immediately after the 
annual  evaluation,  while  the remainder is held in abeyance until the  end of the 
executive's term of office, typically three-years, and disbursed completely only if the 
executive gets at least a C grade in the triennial evaluation.
14    In both evaluations, 
the SASAC is to gauge the performance of the SOE under the executive's stewardship 
in terms of  absolute  profits,  economic value added (EVA),  appreciation  in  asset 
valuations,  and  annualized  revenue  growth  rates  in  the  SOE's  primary  line  of 
business.   
The grades an SOE executive attains also affect his subsequent career path.  
But, as noted above, the SASAC makes recommendations regarding SOE executives' 
promotions at their triennial evaluations.  The Organization Department of the  CCP 
then promotes, demotes, or laterally transfers the executive to his next position, 
which is seldom with the same SOE (McGregor 2010).    Rather, SOE executives' next 
positions are typically at other SOEs or in government bureaucracies or Party organs.   
                                                           
13  Source: speech by Mr Li Rongrong, director of    State Council SASAC in Jan 9, 2010.   
14  See the latest version of "Interim Provisions on Performance Evaluations for Executives of C-SOEs" 
(State Council SASAC Document 22, 2009) for more details.  
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The  Organization  Department  of  the  CCP  ranks  all  government,  Party,  and  SOE 
positions so that promotions, demotions, and lateral transfers can be clearly defined.           
This  subjects  top  executives  to  a  loyalty  test:  career  success  depends  on 
adherence to CCP policies and harmonious cooperation advancing CCP priorities, or 
perhaps more accurately, obedience to senior government and Party officials' orders.   
A top SOE executive judged unresponsive to such direction risks not being promoted, 
or even being demoted at the end of his three-year term ends – even if his SOEs 
performs well.    Kato and Lang (2004), Bai and Xu (2005), Firth, Fung and Rui (2006), 
Zhao,  Yang  and  Bai  (2007)  find  top  executive  turnovers  in  listed  Chinese  SOEs 
significantly less related to ROA, ROS and other performance indicators than in other 
listed firms. 
The  SASAC  reforms  are  problematic  for  two  reasons.    First,  the  reforms 
seemingly  give  SOE  top  executives  greater  autonomy  by  excising  them  from  the 
bureaucratic chain of command within a ministry.    However, SOE executives' career 
prospects  still  depend  on  decisions  by  the  Organization  Department  of  the  CCP, 
which is charged with ensuring loyalty to Party and government policies.    Second, 
the reforms explicitly link SOE executive bonuses to quantitatively measurable SOE 
financial performance indicators: profits, EVA, asset value appreciation, and revenue 
growth. (These are supplemented by share values in only a handful of listed SOEs.)   
However, all four primary financial indicators measure short-term performance, and 
SOE executives' bonuses and promotions depend on three annual evaluations and 
one triennial evaluation by the relevant SASAC.    In almost all cases, three years of  
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good performance locks in the executive's bonuses and justifies a promotion by the 
CCP Organization Department to a higher position in a government bureaucracy or a 
different SOE.    Policies that artificially inflated short-term performance and create 
future problems are someone else's problem.   
In  summary,  the  reforms  sever  SOE  executives  from  the  ministries  that 
formerly contained them, but preserve the Party's incontestable control over SOE 
executives'  careers.    The  reforms  tie  SOE  executive  bonuses  to  SOE  financial 
performance  measures,  but  only  to  measures  of  short-term  performance.    The 
overall effect of the reforms on the efficiency of resource allocation is thus quite 
ambiguous.         
The overall effect of the SASAC reforms is thus a priori unclear.    SOE top 
executives have greater autonomy than before, but  are also likely under greater 
pressure.    On  the  one  hand,  this  pressure  encourages  better  SOE  performance 
because top executive compensation is more explicitly tied to SOE performance and, 
in the case of a few listed SOEs, share prices.    On the other hand, this pressure 
subjects  SOE  top  executives  to  more  political  interference  because  their  career 
prospects depend on their loyalty to the Party and the government.         
These dual criteria for evaluating SOE top executives – deliver profits and 
serve the government – can align if, as Deng Xiaoping proclaimed, "to be rich is 
glorious" (zhi fu guang rong).    But if government priorities shift away from this, SOE 
performance and loyalty may conflict; and SOE top executives must balance dual 
objectives:  augmenting  corporate  performance  for  the  sake  of  their  near-term  
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compensation,  but  obeying  government  directives  to  protect  their  longer  term 
careers.   
The  balance  in  such  cases  is  almost  certainly  strongly  tilted  towards 
obedience to government directives, for the Organization Department of the  CCP 
remains overwhelmingly important to advancing or blocking SOE executives' careers 
at all levels.    Risking the Organization Department's displeasure by defying political 
directives  to  protect  an  SOE's  financial  bottom  line  would  likely  appeal  to  few 
ambitious managers.       
We  believe  that  China's  recent  stimulus  package  took  effect  within  this 
context. Top executives of SOE banks and nonfinancial SOEs obeyed  government 
orders to lend and to invest, respectively, but did so in ways that minimized damage 
to their SOEs' near-term profitability.    Specifically, SOE bank executives lent, not to 
private entrepreneurs, but to nonfinancial SOEs because the latter were unlikely to 
fail in a macroeconomic downturn.    SOEs invested not in productivity-enhancing 
corporate assets, but in real estate.    We posit that this response explains the speed 
and  scale  of  the  stimulus  package's  impact.    To  the  extent  that  the  stimulus 
successfully  corrected  a  market  failure,  this  may  well  benefit  macroeconomic 
performance.    But if SOE executives' responses to the stimulus misallocated the 




2.2    Current Status of SOEs 
To play a major role in effecting the central government's macroeconomic stimulus, 
SOEs  must  be  an  economically  significant  part  of  the  economy.    Despite  the 
ongoing reorganization and privatization of small- and medium-sized SOEs, which 
has caused a steady decline in the number of SOEs over the past decade, SOEs retain 
the commanding heights of the Chinese economy.     
The past three censuses by National Bureau of Statistics in China (Table 1) show 
the number of SOEs, financial and nonfinancial, falling from 369,000 (12.19% of all 
enterprises) in 2001 to 192,000 (5.91%) in 2004, and then 156,000 (3.15%) in 2008.   
Over the same time span, the number of private enterprises nearly tripled, and the 
number of joint-stock enterprises not explicitly controlled by the State rose by over 
110%.    The State Council SASAC's statistics also show the number of non-financial 
SOEs controlled by provincial-level or higher SASACs falling from 150,000 at the end 
of 2003 to 115,115 at the end of 2009. 
===Insert Table 1 about here=== 
However, numbers alone do not gauge importance.    The Party's policy of 
"grasping the big, letting go the small" (zhua da fang xiao) SOEs means that the 
remaining stable of SOEs is successively narrowed to the very largest.    These mainly 
include  monopolies  in  the  natural  resources  and  infrastructure  sectors  (such  as 
mining, electricity, telecom, and fuels), and a few leading companies in some other  
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important industries (such as real estate, construction,  and car manufacturing).
15  
The 2008 Economic Census thus classifies only 3.15% of all enterprises as SOEs, but 
these  contained  30.53%  of  total  enterprise  assets  (Table  2).   Listed  SOEs  also 
constituted 27.85% of the total market capitalization of the  Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock markets at the end of 2009.    Thus, China's remaining SOEs are extraordinarily 
large, and quite plausibly continue to play central roles in their industries and in the 
national economy.      
===Insert Table 2 about here=== 
Moreover, these figures almost certainly greatly understate the true scope of 
state  control  over  nominally  private  sector  and  listed  firms  because  many  SOEs 
control  business  groups.    These  structures  resemble  large  family  controlled 
pyramidal groups, in which an apex family firm controls a first tier of listed firms, 
each of which controls other listed firms, each of which controls yet more listed 
firms, and so on (La Porta et al. 1999; Morck, Stangeland, Yeung 2000).    However, 
the structures being organized in China feature an SOE, rather than a family firm, at 
the apex.    A firm in the lower tiers may seem to lack any controlling shareholder 
(and thus not explicated labeled as SOE), but the combined stakes of several SOEs or 
SOE controlled firms may aggregate to a control block.       
The 142 C-SOEs still extant in 2008 controlled 19,250 other enterprises.    Of 
these, 8,524 are wholly state-owned; another 9,534 are listed as state-controlled; 
                                                           




and  the  remaining  1,192  are  explicitly  grouped  as  non-SOEs.    Of  the  19,250 
enterprises,  State  Council  SASAC’s  statistics  count  235  as  listed  in  mainland 
exchanges and 71 as listed in Hong Kong.    By the end of 2009, the number of listed 
C-SOE-controlled  firms  in  the  mainland  and  Hong  Kong  rose  to  260  and  88, 
respectively.
16  According to the State Council SASAC's statistics, nonfinancial C-SOEs 
accounted for about 40% of total nonfinancial SOE assets, over 60% of  their sales, 
and over 70% of their profits in 2009. 
In summary, despite  their small and decreasing numbers,  SOEs, especially 
large C-SOEs, remain very significant economically.    That they could play a central 
role in effecting China's macroeconomic stimulus package is quite plausible.     
 
2.3    SOE Banks 
State-owned banks dominated China's financial sector since 1949 (Allen, Qian and 
Qian,  2005,  2008),  and  recent  reforms  have  not  altered  this.    Banking  sector 
reforms closely parallel those described above in connection with non-financial SOEs.   
In 2003, as the SASACs were founded, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) was also founded to direct and supervise the operation of all banks.    Unlike 
the SASACs, the CBRC does not hold shares in the SOEs it directs.    Rather, the major 
shareholders in SOE banks are the Ministry of Finance and a C-SOE, the Central Huijin 
Investment Ltd.     
                                                           
16  Source: State Council SASAC, “2009 Annual Report,” Aug 3, 2010.  
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The Central Huijin Investment Ltd was established in 2003 as a branch of the 
State Association for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), an administrative agency subordinate 
to  the  People's  Bank  of  China.    The  State  Council  authorized  Central  Huijin 
Investment  Ltd  to  buy  equity  in  financial  SOEs,  thereby  injecting  capital  to 
compensate  for  their  accumulated  nonperforming  loans  problems.    In  2007, 
Central Huijin Investment Ltd was corporatized as a subsidiary of CIC, China's newly 
formed sovereign wealth fund (Pistor 2010).   
A fully owned subsidiary, Central Huijin constituted roughly one third of the 
CIC's total assets in 2007.    However, the CIC has no governance powers: Central 
Huijin's corporate charter specifies that its management and supervisory boards are 
to be appointed directly by the State Council (Pistor 2010).    Ownership and control 
thus appear fully separated.    However, in practice, the Organization Department of 
the CCP actually appoints the top executives of Central Huijin and the CIC, and the 
CIC's  portfolio  is  de  facto  an  investments  arm  of  the  CCP;  perhaps  reuniting 
ownership  and  control at  a  more  basic  level  (Huang  1996;  Shih  2008;  McGregor 
2010).         
Within this institutional framework, the CBRC and the Ministry of Finance 
issue documents, like those issued by the SASACs, directing SOE banks' governance.   
For example, the "Interim Provisions on Performance Evaluation of State-owned and 
State-Controlled Financial Enterprises", issued by the Ministry of Finance in 2009, 
mandates the periodic evaluation of each SOE bank's profitability, asset appreciation, 
asset quality and solvency for purposes of determining the salary, reappointment  
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and promotion of each top executive.    Also as with nonfinancial SOEs, SOE banks' 
core  executives  are  appointed,  removed  and  re-assigned  by  the  Organization 
Department of the CCP.    Top executives at SOE banks thus confront the same dual 
goals of good firm performance and loyalty to government dictates that other SOEs 
contend with. 
The People's Bank of China, the country's central bank, classifies banks by 
ownership  structure.    Three  important  banks  –  the  China  Development  Bank, 
Export-Import  Bank  of  China,  and  Agriculture  Development  Bank  of  China  –  are 
classified as "policy banks."  These remain fully and directly owned by the state, 
and  are  intended  as  tools  for  state  intervention  in  the  economy.    Another  four 
major banks – the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, 
Agricultural  Bank  of  China,  and  Bank  of  China  –  are  classified  as  "state-owned 
commercial  banks."  These  were  corporatized  and  subsequently  listed,  but  have 
long  histories  of  state  control  with  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Central  Huijin 
Investment Ltd holding sufficient equity blocks to lock in state control.    Thirteen 
other major banks are classified as "joint stock commercial banks."  Eleven of these 
have a C-SOE, L-SOE, or subnational government organ as their largest shareholder.
17   
Rural credit cooperation associations, city commercial banks, foreign banks, and 
certain other financial institutions fall outside these categories.    Thus, eighteen of 
                                                           
17  The central government, either directly or via C-SOEs, is the largest shareholder in five of these: the 
Bank  Of  Communications,  China  Citic  Bank,  China  Everbright  Bank,  Huaxia  Bank  and  China 
Merchants  Bank).    The  other  six,  with  local  governments  as  the  largest  shareholder,  are  the 
Industrial Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Evergrowing 
Bank, China Zheshang Bank and China Bohai Bank.  
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the  twenty  largest  banks  are  directly  State  controlled  and,  at  the  end  of  2009, 
accounted for RMB58.58 trillion, or about 73% of total bank assets (Table 3). 
===Insert Table 3 about here=== 
 
3.    China's SOE Macroeconomic Policy Channel 
3.1    SOEs' Responses to Stimulus 
Figure 4 shows how the global financial crisis hit China's finance sector.    China's 
bankers' confidence index, based on the People's Bank of China's quarterly survey of 
about 3,000 city- or higher-level bank branch managers, dropped sharply in 2008 Q4, 
and bottomed out in 2009 Q1.     
Amid  this  drop  in  banker  confidence,  the  government  announced  an 
expansionary  shift  in  monetary  policy;  and  China's  four  state-owned  commercial 
banks  and  thirteen  joint-stock  commercial  banks  immediately  initiated  a  huge 
volume of new loans in the 1
st quarter of 2009 (Figure 4).    The four state-owned 
commercial  banks'  total  loan  balance  rose  by  RMB2.31  trillion  in  that  quarter, 
substantially more than the 1.80 trillion increase over the entire year of 2008, and 
increased by RMB4.10 trillion over the full year of 2009.    This raised their share of 
total loan volume from 36.78% in 2008 to 42.73% in 2009, abruptly reversing their 
steady loss of market share to city commercial banks and foreign banks.    China's  
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joint-stock commercial banks likewise increased their loans outstanding by RMB1.18 
trillion in the 1
st quarter of 2009 and RMB2.23 trillion over in that whole year. 
===Insert Figure 4 about here=== 
The  global  downturn  also  hurt  non-financial  SOEs  badly.    State  Council 
SASAC's statistics for 2008 show non-financial SOEs' profits decreased by 24.5% at 
the national level, with 45.5% of the SOEs suffering losses.    Both ROS and profits 
were in deep troughs in 2008, and neither improved until 2009 Q3 (see Figure 5). 
The performance of C-SOEs, also tracked by the State Council SASAC, shows a similar 
pattern.    China's entrepreneur  confidence  index,  based  on  a National  Bureau  of 
Statistics quarterly nationwide survey of 20,000 enterprise managers, hit a historic 
low at the start of 2009 (Figure 6).    Nonetheless, these too stepped forth to do 
their bit.     
Non-financial SOEs responded to the government's call for economic stimulus 
with a prompt and substantial hike in investment.    Prior to 2008, SOEs' annualized 
real growth rate in fixed asset investment typically lagged that of non-SOEs by about 
ten percentage points (Figure 6).    But this growth rate increased sharply – from 
21.09% in 2008 Q4 to 38.50% in 2009 Q1 and 45.30% in 2009 Q2.    Across all four 
quarters  of  2009,  the  SOEs'  fixed  asset  investment  growth  rate  remained 
substantially higher than normal.    In contrast, non-SOEs' annualized growth rate in 




===Insert Figure 5 about here=== 
===Insert Figure 6 about here=== 
With  banker  and  entrepreneur  confidence  indexes  dragging  at  or  near 
historic lows, and with banks and nonfinancial SOEs navigating through increasingly 
choppy business environments, these sudden expansions in lending and investment 
were  unlikely  to  be  driven  by  enterprise  profit  maximization.    Rather,  the  top 
executives  at  SOE  banks  and  nonfinancial  SOEs  were  instructed  to  pursue  these 
policies by the government.   
The  SASACs  made  "contributions  to  the  stimulus  plan"  a  new  corporate 
performance objective, as highlighted in State Council SASAC's 2009 annual report, 
to  be  used  in  evaluating  SOE  executives;  and  most  SOE  banks'  and  nonfinancial 
enterprises'  annual  reports,  or  similar  documents,  echo  this.    Senior  Chinese 
government officials' speeches exhorted SOEs to "serve the country's interest", and 
the Organization Department of the CCP weighed obedience to Party thought heavily 
in promoting, renewing, or demoting SOE executives.    Thus, responding quickly and 
meaningfully to the government's macroeconomic stimulus became an SOE's "policy 




3.2    Potential Problems with the SOE Channel 
The dual objectives assigned managers of SOE banks and nonfinancial SOEs – to 
advance  the  government's  political  objectives  and  optimize  SOE  financial 
performance – remained in effect as SOEs fulfilled these policy burdens.    Assessing 
borrowers on the basis of the likely financial viability of their investment plans is 
time consuming and requires expensive expertise.    Given the government's policy 
directive  to  increase  lending  immediately  and  substantially,  careful  evaluation  of 
lending  decisions  was  almost  certainly  simply  not  possible.    Rational  SOE  bank 
executives would doubtless obey the directive, but perhaps in ways that minimize 
damage to the financial performance of their banks, thereby protecting their annual 
bonus packages and their promotion prospects at the end of their three-year terms 
in their current positions.    SOE Banks, obliged to issue huge volume of loans, would 
thus favor borrowers perceived as unlikely to default, at least in the near future.   
For several reasons, bankers saw large C-SOEs as preferred borrowers.    First, 
large C-SOEs were widely thought "too big to fail".    If the downturn proved long 
and deep, the State was likely to save them from serious trouble.    Second, lending 
to large C-SOEs was "politically correct."  Nonperforming loans to other borrowers, 
especially private  corporations,  would  leave  SOE  bankers  open  to  criticism.    But 
decisions to let SOEs, especially C-SOEs, renege on debts would be made by high 
government  and  party  officials,  sheltering  SOE  bankers  from  blame.    Such  
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reasoning appears to have been persuasive, for listed C-SOEs received nearly 60% of 
all new loans to all companies listed in mainland exchanges in 2009.
18 
The managers of nonfinancial SOEs, having borrowed these funds, had to 
invest them quickly to demonstrate adherence to the  government's stimulus plan, 
but also avoid damaging the financial performance of their SOEs, and thus their 
bonus income streams.    Like the top managers of SOE banks, nonfinancial SOEs are 
evaluated annually for bonuses and triennially for promotions.  In vestments that 
would not show major problems for at least three years were thus needed. 
Large corporate capital investments require careful planning, forecasting, risk 
assessment,  and  other  financial  analysis;  and  this  too  takes  time  and  money.    
Formulating  profitable  capital investments is daunting under normal conditions; 
amid a global economic downturn, the task can be petrifying. Nonfinancial SOE 
managers were thus hesitant to invest in property, plant, and equipment associated 
with their primary lines of business; fearing that such investments would do poorly 
in the near-term future.  The  National Bureau of Statistics estimates the mean ROA 
of 23 of the 38 industrial sectors it covers as below the loan interest rate (5.31%) in 
2008.    
Thus, nonfinancial SOE managers needed nontraditional investments whose 
returns would likely cover their borrowing costs  – at least until positive triennial 
evaluations moved them on to higher positions elsewhere in the economy.   
                                                           
18  Source: Author’ calculation based on annual report data in the Genius Finance Database.  
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Real  estate  seemed  to  fill  this  bill  for  several  reasons.    First,  real  estate 
prices  in  major  cities  rose  steadily  over  the  preceding  years,  making  residential 
construction  one  of  the  most  profitable  industries.    The  two  latest  economic 
censuses show the ROS of the real estate sector rising faster than in any other sector 
– from 8.31% in 2004 to 12.62% in 2008, when it ranked third in profitability, behind 
only "mining" and "other services".    In major cities with hot housing markets, the 
sector's ROS was even higher in 2008, reaching 14.99% in Beijing and 17.90% in 
Shanghai.    Second, real estate is relatively easy to enter, at least compared to other 
highly profitable industries.    For example, entering "mining", the most profitable 
sector, requires locating and developing ore deposits; and the sector is, in any event, 
given over to state-licensed monopolies.    In contrast, any nonfinancial SOE with 
ready cash might take to buying land or residential apartment blocks, and even to 
building them, with some hope of financial success.       
Accordingly, many C-SOEs, obeying political directives to hike their borrowing 
from SOE banks and invest, opted to invest real estate.    While SASAC guidelines list 
only 16 C-SOEs with real estate development as core business, these and 78 other 
C-SOEs owned or controlled real estate developers by the end of 2009.    Most of 
these concentrated on real estate in a few major cities, where their buying pushed 
up  lot  prices  substantially.    Indeed,  C-SOE  land  purchases  are  widely  thought 
responsible for land and housing price surges these cities experienced during the 




4.    Land Transaction Data 
All urban land was nationalized at the founding of the People's Republic of China in 
1949.    Under the Constitutional Amendment of 1988, the State retains ultimate 
ownership of urban land, but allows individuals and enterprises to lease land use 
rights  for  specified  periods.    For  example,  residential  lot  leases  typically  last  70 
years.    A private housing development project might involve a developer leasing 
lots from a local government, building housing units on the lots, and then selling the 
developed units.    A State Council madate, issued in 2002 and reiterated in 2004, 
requires that leases for urban lots designated for residential development be sold at 
auctions.
19  In most cases, the developer entering the highest bid gets the lease.
  
We  collect  land  parcel auction data  in  eight  major  Chinese  cities:  Beijing, 
Chengdu, Hangzhou, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Wuhan, and Xian.    These are all 
large cities, with relatively developed economies and housing markets.    In 2009, 
their combined GDPs constituted 17.3% of China's GDP, and 35% of new home sales 
occurred within the nation.
20   
Our data, from the  Soufun Database  and local land resources authorities ' 
websites, contain 3,542 land  transaction records.
21  These include all such public 
residential land  lease sales in these eight cities from 2003 Q1 through 2010 Q1 , 
except leases for land entirely  designated for public housing, which we exclude 
                                                           
19  Three variants are permitted: one-stage auction, two-stage auction, and an alternative bidding 
process.    See Cai, Henderson and Zhang (2009) for details. 
20  Calculation based on Nation Bureau of Statistics data and municipal statistics for each city. 
21  Soufun is a leading Chinese data vendor specialized in land and housing transaction data.    The 
company’s website is fdc.soufun.com.    
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because their prices are determined using other mechanisms.  In April 2010, with 
China's  economic  recovery  seemingly  drawing  to  a  successful  conclusion,  with 
America's real estate bubble still in the news, and with high and rising urban land 
prices attracting attention, the State Council SASAC explicitly discouraged C-SOEs, 
especially  those  for  which  real  estate  is  not  a  core  business,  from  further 
participation in lease auctions.    Our data thus includes the period in which China's 
macroeconomic stimulus was in high gear, and in which C-SOE investment options 
were unrestricted.    Table 4 describes the distribution of these transactions across 
the eight major cities we study.     
===Insert Table 4 about here=== 
Our data include each land parcel's location and physical attributes as well as 
its sale price and date.    For each parcel, we ascertain the buyer's characteristics 
from the eight cities' municipal real estate authority databases.    These classify each 
buyer as a C-SOE, L-SOE, or non-SOE and, within each classification, assign the buyers 
grades, from one (highest) through five (lowest), according to size and experience as 
a  developer.    This  also  lets  us  distinguish  listed  from  unlisted  buyers.    Table  5 
displays the definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables so constructed.   
===Insert Table 5 about here===  
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A  cursory  inspection  of  our  data  supports  the  thesis  that  SOEs  abruptly 
increased  their  activity  in  the  real  estate  development  business  as  the 
macroeconomic  stimulus  package  was  unfolded.    Figure  7  shows  SOEs'  market 
share  as  low,  with  non-SOE  developers dominating the  market, until 2008;  after 
which  SOEs,  and  especially  C-SOEs  rapidly  become  major  players.    C-SOE 
developers' share by total value rose from about 15% in 2008 to about 23% in 2009, 
and a historic high of about 33% in 2010 Q1.   
===Insert Figure 7 about here=== 
Table 6 reveals substantial variation across cities in C-SOE entry.  In Beijing, 
their favorite market, C-SOEs roughly doubled their market share from its historic 
level or roughly 24% to 53.54% in 2009 and 2010 Q1, when the stimulus package was 
unfolded.    Simultaneous  surges  in  market  shares  are  also  clearly  evident  in 
Shanghai, Chengdu, and Tianjin, but less so in the other four cities.     




5.    Empirical Analysis of Land Auctions in Eight Major Cities 
5.1    Hedonic Model of Constant Quality Price Index 
Our first objective is to understand whether changes in land parcel prices are related 
to the stimulation packages.    To compare the price of heterogeneous land parcels, 
we use a pooled hedonic land pricing model.    The dependent variable is transaction 
price for each parcel in the logarithmic form (in constant 2003 RMB) measured as 
the price per square meter of the permitted housing floor space.
22  To control for 
quality  variation,  we  include  the  distance  to  the  city  center  ( D_CENTER),  the 
permitted  building  density  expressed  as  permitted  floor  space  over  land  area 
(DENSITY),  and  requirements  to  provide  public  housing  units  on  the  parcel 
(SHARE_PH).    We expect all three to correlate negatively with a parcel's price.    We 
also control for site quality at delivery, measured by whether the land is leveled or 
not (LANDLEVEL), and expect higher prices for leveled land.    We also control for the 
parcel's size (SIZE), requirement to build public utilities such as school or hospital on 
the parcel (PUBLIC), and the form of the transaction (AUCTION for one-stage auction 
and BIDDING for a bidding process, with two-stage auctions as the left-out category).   
All regressions include city and quarter fixed effects.       
Table 7 reports the results of our basic hedonic model, estimated by OLS 
(column 1), sandwich estimator allowing for clustering by city (White 1980; column 
2), and random effect regression (column 3), respectively.   
                                                           
22  Note that in China, land parcels of residential use are always priced in the floor area of housing 
permitted to be built on the parcel, instead of being priced in terms of the land area.  
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The coefficients of the controls are broadly consistent with our expectations.   
Land parcels nearer city centres and with lower building densities fetch higher prices 
per square meter of permitted floor area; though parcels levelled before delivery 
fetch insignificantly higher prices and parcels with public housing requirements fetch 
insignificantly  lower  prices.    The  method  of  sale  controls  associate  one-stage 
auctions with higher prices, two-stage auctions with intermediate prices, and the 
bidding process with lower prices.     
===Insert Table 7 about here=== 
The coefficients on the quarterly time dummies from column 2 of Table 7 are 
plotted in Figure 8; and can be interpreted as a real constant quality residential land 
price index for these cities.    The figure shows land prices surging in 2009 Q2 and 
rising until they peaked  at the  end  of 2009.    Overall,  the  index  almost  doubled 
(97.4%) from 2009 Q1 to 2009 Q4; corresponding neatly to the surge in lending to 
SOEs, and especially C-SOEs that Figure 4 shows beginning in 2009 Q1.     
===Insert Figure 8 about here=== 
A  near  doubling  of  land  price  within  one  year  is  extraordinary  by  any 
reasonable  standards.    Fundamentals  explanations  are  always  possible  if  one  is 
flexible  enough  with  assumptions.    For  example,  wild  swings  in  rational  agents' 
expectations  due  to  radical  shifts  in  political  or  economic  forecasts,  demand,  
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regulation, savings behavior, might do the trick.    However, the abrupt prominence 
of C-SOE developers as land prices surged is surely strong circumstantial evidence 
consistent with our thesis.     
 
5.2      Estimating the Price Effect of SOE Developers 
We further explore the linkage between SOE participation in the real estate 
sector and land parcel prices by including buyer characteristics in our regressions.   
These include indicator variables for buyers controlled by C-SOEs and L-SOEs, CSOE 
and LSOE, respectively; an indicator variable set to one if the buyer is a listed firm, 
LISTED; and a set of indicator variables corresponding to the grade the government 
assigns  the  developer,  GRADE1  through  GRADE5  in  descending  order  of  quality.   
Table  8  reports  the  results.    Again,  like  in  Table  7,  all  the  three  estimators  are 
applied and the results are consistent.  The indicator variables for C-SOE and L-SOE 
buyers, especially the former, attract significantly positive coefficients, implying that 
they offer inexplicably (in terms of the control variables) high prices for land parcels.   
The robust clustered sandwich estimator regressions (column2) show C-SOEs and 
L-SOEs paying 16% and 11% more, respectively, than non-SOE buyers for land parcels 
that are otherwise identical in terms of the characteristics we observe.     
===Insert Table 8 about here===    
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These  price  premiums  at  least  partially  explain  the  surge  we  observe  in 
residential land prices.    Figure 9 provides the constant quality prices of different 
buyer groups.    The figure shows the C-SOE group's constant price index surges in 
2009  Q1,  followed  by  the  other  groups’  price  indices,  and  the  C-SOEs'  index 
persistently exceeds those of others after 2009 Q1.    This clearly suggests that the 
C-SOEs' participation in land lease markets plays a role in the rise of land prices in 
China  from  2009  Q1  through  the  end  of  our  sample.
    Our  estimate  is  likely 
conservative, for in a China without C-SOE bids, other developers bids would surely 
be lower than those we observe.     
===== Insert Figure 9 about here ===== 
5.3    Robustness 
Other factors might contribute to C-SOE real estate developers' high bids.    First, 
C-SOEs'  connections  have  surely  long  provided  privileged  access  to  government 
funds, loans from SOE banks, etc. (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005); which would cut 
their costs of capital and justify their higher bids for land parcels.    Second C-SOEs' 
connections might likewise provide speedier permit approval, utility access, and so 
on; which would make real estate developments more profitable for C-SOEs, again 
justifying their paying higher prices for land parcels.     
However, neither alternative fully explains our findings.    C-SOEs' superior 
connections have long been a fixture of Chinese business (McGregor 2010).    Figure 
9 shows that C-SOEs only began paying prices substantially higher than those paid by  
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other buyers when the stimulus program began.    Before that, C-SOEs' prices were 
sometimes slightly above or below those paid by other buyers.    Table 9 confirms 
that this effect is statistically significant: the gap between C-SOEs' bids and those by 
other buyers became significantly elevated after the first quarter of 2009, when the 
macroeconomic  stimulus  began.    Moreover,  locally-controlled  SOEs  should  also 
have  connections,  especially  with  the  local  authorities  regulating  real  estate 
developments.    Had connections suddenly become a major advantage to SOE real 
estate developers in 2009, L-SOEs should have responded too; but Table 9 shows no 
such effect.     
===== Insert Table 9 about here ===== 
Conceivably, the value of SOEs' connections might have lain dormant until 
2008, when the C-SOEs were suddenly inundated with unprecedented quantities of 
cheap loans, and pressured to invest it quickly.    Location is important in real estate, 
and SOE executives' connections are likely to be especially useful in the cities that 
host their headquarters.    Indeed, access to local networks is thought important in 
explaining  agglomeration  in  developed  economies  (Ellison  and  Glaeser,  1999).   
Table 10 investigates this by including interactions to see if C-SOEs pay more for land 
nearer  their  headquarters.    This  is  observed,  but  the  stimulus  effect  remains 
significant.    Thus, Table 10 concedes that connections may indeed help C-SOE land 
developers,  but  reaffirms  a  transmission  role  for  C-SOEs  in  the  macroeconomic 
stimulus.      
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==== Table 10 about here ===== 
Another possibility is that we control imperfectly for land parcel quality, and 
C-SOEs might be disproportionately purchasing higher quality land after 2008.    We 
therefore  consider  additional  variables  in  our  hedonic  regressions.    Beijing, 
Shenzhen,  Shanghai,  Tianjin,  and  Wuhan  have  subways,  so  we  introduce  the 
logarithm of the distance to the nearest subway station as another quality measure 
and  rerun  our  regressions  using  only  data  from  these  five  cities.    This  exercise 
generates qualitatively similar results to those shown in the tables, by which we 
mean  identical  patterns  of  signs  and  significance  levels  and  roughly  comparable 
coefficient magnitudes.     
Another  approach  to  capture  the  effects  of  missing  hedonic  factors  is  to 
directly introduce the price of comparable newly-built housing units.    We therefore 
match each land transactions in Beijing with the price of newly completed residential 
housing no more than five kilometers away and sold no more than twelve months 
earlier.    This lets us match each of 296 land transactions to one or more of 907 
completed residential housing developments.    For each transaction, we take the 
average  sale  price  during  the  previous  month  of  housing  units  in  the  matched 
completed  developments,  weighted by  the  reciprocal  of the  distance.    We  then 
include this "neighborhood price" as an additional right-hand side variable.    This 




6.     Macroeconomic Impact of C-SOE Land Transactions 
For  SOEs  to  constitute  a  macroeconomic  policy  channel,  their  real  estate 
investments and the associated surge in land prices must have a macroeconomic 
impact.    Two direct effects contribute to GDP.     
First,  by  increasing  the  overall  value  of  land  transactions,  C-SOEs  directly 
elevate aggregate investment and therefore GDP.    To assess the importance of the 
real estate related sectors to GDP, we calculate what GDP growth would have been 
without the real estate related sectors.
23    For example,  China's 2009 GDP growth 
was 9.3%, but  would have been only 8.3%  without real estate  related sectors.  In 
other words, the real estate  related sectors were responsible for roughly 11% of 
total GDP growth.    Figure 10 graphs this fraction by year, and shows the real estate 
related sectors' contribution to GDP growth peaking in 2009.        
===Insert Figure 10 about here=== 
Second, revenue from land lease sales accrues to Chinese government.    In 
2009 total government spending grew by 23%, from RMB 6.26 trillion in 2008 to 
RMB 7.63 trillion in 2009; while total budgetary government revenues rose only 11.7% 
to RMB 6.85 trillion.    This left Chinese government with an overall deficit of RMB 
0.78 trillion, 6.2 times as much as that in 2008.
24    Governments' revenues from land 
sales – RMB 1.39 trillion in 2009, and up over 60% from the previous year, was thus 
                                                           
23  In the calculations, we define "real estate related sectors" as the aggregate of the real estate and 
construction industries. 
24  Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China.    
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an important factor in preventing a major contraction in government spending.
25  
Clearly, the hike in land auction income played a critical role in financing the fiscal 
stimulation policies for Chinese government.
26 
However,  sustainably high GDP  growth  in the long run depends on the 
efficiency of resource allocation.    Wu, Gyourko and Deng (2010) argue that Chinese 
land prices were already above fundamental values in some cities, notably  Beijing, 
prior to the stimulus package, and that 2009 and early 2010 saw increasingly 
effervescent  land  prices.    While  this  might  increase  nominal  wealth  for 
homeowners, and thus encourage them to increase consumption; it burdens others 
with larger interest payments, decreasing their quality of life.  Moreover, as recent 
American macroeconomic events make clear, the implosion of a  real estate  price 
bubble decreases  homeowners'  wealth  significantly, reduces their consumption, 
leaves people burdened with large debts, and leaves the economy with a surfeit of 
unprofitable housing developments.    If China's macroeconomic stimulus via its SOE 
channel is merely replicating t his effect, a truly epic tale of short -term gain for 
long-term pain may be unfolding. 
 
                                                           
25  Source: Soufun Database.   
26  More precisely, land auction income is especially important for financing local government since in 
China all land revenues accrue to local governments.    In 2009 the overall deficit at local government 
level reached RMB2.8 trillion.  
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7.    Conclusion 
China's  macroeconomic  stimulus  had  an  extraordinarily  large  and  rapid  effect.     
This reflects the central government's continued direct controls over much of the 
economy.    The central government ordered its SOE banks to lend, and they lent; 
but  primarily  to  the  central  government's  nonfinancial  SOEs.    The  central 
government ordered its nonfinancial SOEs to invest, and they invested; but primarily 
in  real  estate.    This  increased  GDP  substantially  and  rapidly  in  2009,  effectively 
countering  the  effects  of  the  global  financial  crisis  that  affected  many  other 
countries that year.     
However,  the  success  of  this  stimulus  may  well  disguise  a  curse.  The 
economic  logic  behind  a  monetary  stimulation  is  to  keep  credit  flowing  to 
economically viable firms by countering banks' tendency to tighten credit constraints 
during a downturn.    The Chinese stimulus, in contrast, strengthened the flow of 
credit  into  already  cash-flush  C-SOEs,  which  were  almost  certainly  not  credit 
constrained at the time.     
Two  conclusions  follow.    First,  China  remains  fundamentally  a  command 
and control economy, despite its seemingly rapid embrace of markets.    Compared 
with most developed economies and most other emerging economies, the Chinese 
economy  remains  subject  to  remarkably  sweeping  direct  control  by  the  central 
government.    While other governments must rely on "jawboning" and interest rate 
signals to stimulate lending and investment, China's government can simply decree 
that its SOEs affect a macroeconomic stimulus.    The "Chinese model" of economic  
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development,  with  the  Communist  Party  retaining  the  economy's  commanding 
heights, has generated three decades of rapid growth.    To the extent that such 
"ordered up" lending and investment artificially accelerated real estate investment 
and elevated real estate prices, above fundamentals, a major misallocation of the 
economy's resources may have ensued.    This may brake future growth.             
Second,  the  macroeconomic  effectiveness  of  expansionary  fiscal  and 
monetary policies depend, in the long run, on sustained microeconomic efficiency.   
The microeconomic implications of China's "ordered up" macroeconomic stimulus 
are unclear, but our first pass over the figures suggests at least the possibility of an 
expanding housing bubble in 2009 and 2010.     
A sharp drop in housing prices in China is unlikely to trigger a financial crisis 
of the sort America recently experienced.    This is because the C-SOE banks that 
abruptly upped their lending and the nonfinancial C-SOEs that recycled those loans 
into  real  estate  remain  cash  flush.    A  collapse  in  land  prices  would  harm  their 
balance sheets, but is unlikely to damage them severely.    In addition, widespread 
mortgage defaults by home buyers are unlikely because required down-payments 
ranged from thirty to forty percent.    Homeowners might take capital losses, but 
would  not  profit  from  abandoning  their  investments  unless  the  prices  collapsed 
utterly.    Finally, home ownership in China opens access to social benefits, such as 
schools, and contributes to one's social status.    Such considerations make mortgage 
defaults costly, even if the mortgage is somewhat "under-water" – that is, even if 
property values fall below outstanding mortgage debts.        
43 
 
Nonetheless, a sharp decline in house price would mean a sharp decline in 
the wealth of many Chinese people.    Chinese still have access to only a very limited 
range  of  saving  and  investment  instruments:  essentially  only  bank  accounts, 
domestic stocks, and real estate.    By storing much of their wealth in real estate, 
many Chinese households have become house price dependent.    While an abrupt 
collapse  in  house  price  would  likely  not  irreparably  damage  C-SOE  banks  or 
nonfinancial C-SOEs with real estate operations, it would almost surely substantially 
decrease household wealth.    This negative wealth effect could become a sustained 
drag on aggregate demand, possibly inflicting wore long-run damage on the Chinese 
economy that the recent crisis inflicted on the U.S. economy.     
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Figure 1: Annualized Real Growth Rate of M2 and Loan Balances   
 
Source: People's Bank of China (the central bank of China). 
 
 
Figure 2: Annualized Real Growth Rate of Investment in Fixed Assets   
 



































































































































































Figure 3: Structure of SASAC Institutions 
China's  roughly  300  SASACs  include  the  SASAC  of  the  State  Council,  which 
supervises SOEs controlled by the national government; about 30 province-level 
SASACs,  which  supervise  provincially-controlled  SOEs;  and  numerous  municipal 
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Figure 4: Loan Balance Increments and Bankers' Confidence Index 
 
Source: People's Bank of China (the central bank in China). 
Figure 5: Quarterly Performance of SOEs 
 










































































































































































































Figure 6: Annualized Real Growth Rate of Fixed Asset Investment   
and Entrepreneurs' Confidence   
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China. 
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Figure 7: Market Share of the Three Categories of Buyers 
Categories  are  central  government-controlled  state-owned  enterprise  (CSOE), 
lower-level  government-controlled  state-owned  enterprises  (LSOE),  and 
enterprises not designated as controlled by a government (NSOE).     
 
(A)  Market Share by Total Floor Area 
 
 
(B) Market Share by Total Value 
 
Source: Authors' calculation. 

































Figure 8: Constant Quality Index of Residential Land Price Index 



































































































































Figure 9: Constant Quality Residential Land Prices Paid, by Buyer Type 
A model similar with that in Table 8 is estimated.    Dependant variable is log of 
land  price  per  square  meter  of  permitted  housing  floor  area.    The  C-SOE  and 
L-SOE  dummies  are  introduced  as  cross  terms  with  time  dummies.    Other 
right-hand-side variables are consistent with those in Table 8.  A bundle of typical 
land parcel attributes are then adopted to predict the constant quality land price 





   









































































































































Figure 10: Contribution of Real Estate Related Sectors to GDP Growth 
 
Source: Authors' calculation based on statistics reported by National Bureau of Statistics. 
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Table 1: Thousands of Enterprises, by Control Category     
  2001  2004  2008 
Domestic- Funded Enterprises       
State Owned Enterprises  369  192  156 
Collective Enterprises  858  456  260 
Other Joint-Stock Enterprises  300  406  638 
Private Enterprises  1324  1982  3596 
Other Types  37  62  124 
Foreign-Funded Enterprise  139  152  186 
Total  3027  3250  4960 
Note:  According  to  the  definition  of  National  Bureau  of  Statistics,  China,  "state  owned 
enterprises" refer to enterprises which the State (i.e., certain SASAC or SOE) is the only 
owner or majority shareholder (with more than 50% of share); "collective enterprises" refer 
to enterprises jointed-owned by a certain group of people (such as village or neighborhood); 
"other joint-stock enterprises" refer to joint-stock enterprises without any single SASAC or 
SOE  as  the  dominant  shareholder;  "private  enterprises"  refer  to  enterprises  owned  by 
certain person; and "foreign-funded enterprises" refer to enterprises owned or controlled by 
persons or companies outside mainland China. 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China. 
 
 
Table 2: Asset Shares of Various Enterprises in 2008 
 
Asset 
(trillion yuan RMB) 
Proportion in   
Total Volume 
Domestic- Funded Enterprises     
State Owned Enterprises  63.5  30.53% 
Collective Enterprises  9.0    4.33% 
Other Joint-Stock Enterprises  86.9    41.78% 
Private Enterprises  25.7    12.36% 
Other Types  1.4    0.67% 
Foreign-Funded Enterprise  21.5    10.34% 
Total  208.0    100.00% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China.  
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Table 3: Banking Financial Institutions at the End of 2009 
  Number 
Asset 
(trillion RMB) 
  Amount  Share  Amount  Share 
Policy Banks  3  0.05%  6.95  8.63% 
State-Owned Commercial Banks  4  0.07%  39.04  48.47% 
Joint-Stock Commercial Banks         
State as Largest Share Holder  11  0.20%  12.59  15.63% 
Others  2  0.04%  2.01  2.50% 
Others           
City Commercial Banks and Credit Union  158  2.80%  5.71  7.09% 
Rural Commercial Banks and Credit Union  5241  93.02%  8.64  10.73% 
Postal Savings Bank  1  0.02%  2.70  3.35% 
Foreign Banks  32  0.57%  1.35  1.68% 
Non-Bank Institutions  182  3.23%  1.55  1.92% 
Total  5634  100.00%  80.53  100.00% 
Note: See the text for the full list of the four groups of banks. 
Source: People's Bank of China; China Banking Regulatory Commission.    
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Table 4: Geographic Distribution of Land Transactions 
City  Deals 
Floor Area   
(million sq.m.) 
Total Price   
(billion yuan RMB) 
Average Price   
(2003 yuan per sq.m.) 
Beijing  309  44.31  186.10  4200 
Chengdu  710  113.58  126.22  1111 
Hangzhou  704  60.89  214.86  3529 
Shanghai  401  48.22  167.99  3484 
Shenzhen  115  13.89  35.02  2521 
Tianjin  449  105.60  128.00  1212 
Wuhan  637  84.51  103.81  1228 
Xian  217  32.89  23.86  725 
Total  3542  503.88  985.87  1957 
 
 
Table 5: Definition and Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev. 
LP 
Land parcel transaction price (constant 2003 
RMB  per  square  meter  of  floor  area  of 
housing permitted to build on the parcel). 
2145.21  2838.51 
D_CENTER  Distance to the city center; in kilometers.  25.61  23.17 
DENSITY  Ratio of floor area to land area.  2.54  1.53 
RATIO_PH 
Share of public housing required in the total 
floor area of the parcel. 
0.0026  0.051 
LANDLEVEL 
The  parcel  is  leveled  when  delivered  to  the 
buyer or not; 1=yes, 0=o/w. 
0.57  0.50 
SIZE 
Floor area permitted to build on the parcel; in 
million square meters. 
0.14  0.25 
PUBLIC 
Part of the parcel is designated for public use 
or not; 1=yes, 0=o/w. 
0.045  0.21 
AUCTION 
The parcel is transacted by one-stage auction 
or not; 1=yes, 0=o/w. 
0.24  0.43 
BIDDING 
The  parcel  is  transacted  by  bidding  or  not; 
1=yes, 0=o/w. 
0.097  0.30 
CSOE 
The parcel is purchased by a C-SOE developer 
or not; 1=yes, 0=o/w. 
0.080  0.27 
LSOE 
The parcel is purchased by an L-SOE developer 
or not; 1=yes, 0=o/w. 
0.20  0.40 
LISTED 
The parcel is purchased by a listed company or 
not; 1=yes, 0=o/w. 
0.24  0.43 
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Table 6: C-SOE Developers' Share in Land Market (by Total Value) 
City  2003-2008  2009-2010(1) 
Beijing  24.33%  53.53% 
Chengdu  16.01%  26.31% 
Hangzhou  8.24%  6.68% 
Shanghai  19.85%  29.97% 
Shenzhen  31.55%  6.76% 
Tianjin  9.63%  17.19% 
Wuhan  19.24%  23.37% 
Xian  8.91%  12.98% 
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Table 7: Basic Hedonic Model of Land Parcels' Price 
Sample is all land transactions from the first quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of 
2010  in  eight  major  cities,  as described in Table  4.    Dependant  variable  is  the 
natural  log  of  land  price  per  square  meter  of  permitted  housing  floor  area. 
Right-hand-side  variables  as  defined  in  Table  5.    Numbers  in  parentheses  are 
t-ratios (column 1), or robust t-ratios adjusted for city-level clustering (column 2), 
or t-ratios allowing for random effects (column 3).   
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  OLS  Clustered by City  Random Effects 
log(D_CENTER)  -0.77  (-51.05)***  -0.77  (-24.70)***  -0.77  (-51.27)*** 
DENSITY  -0.12  (-12.55)***  -0.12  (-4.85)***  -0.12  (-12.66)*** 
SHARE_PH  -0.11  (-0.44)        -0.11  (-0.82)        -0.10  (-0.43)       
LANDLEVEL  0.072  (1.18)        0.072  (0.63)        0.074  (1.24)       
SIZE  -0.11  (-2.24)**    -0.11  (-2.15)**    -0.11  (-2.27)**   
PUBLIC  0.17  (2.51)**    0.17  (2.80)***  0.17  (2.58)**   
AUCTION  0.29  (6.39)***  0.29  (4.50)***  0.29  (6.38)*** 
BIDDING  -0.088  (-1.69)*      -0.088  (-0.88)        -0.087  (-1.68)*     
City Dummies  YES  YES  NO 
Time Dummies  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.99  0.99  - 
Notes: (1) Coefficients of city and time fixed effects are not show.    . 
(2) Number of observations is 3478.     
(3) ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level;*: significant at the 10% level.  
60 
 
Table 8: Effect of Buyers' Type on Land Parcels' Price   
Sample is all land transactions from the first quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of 
2010  in  eight  major  cities,  as described in Table  4.    Dependant  variable  is  the 
natural  log  of  land  price  per  square  meter  of  permitted  housing  floor  area.   
Right-hand-side  variables  as  defined  in  Table  5.    Numbers  in  parentheses  are 
t-ratios (column 1), or robust t-ratios adjusted for city-level clustering (column 2), 
or t-ratios allowing for random effects (column 3).   
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  OLS  Clustered by City  Random Effects 
CSOE  0.16  (3.16)***  0.16  (2.79)***  0.16  (3.18)*** 
LSOE  0.11  (3.56)***  0.11  (2.96)***  0.11  (3.59)*** 
log(D_CENTER)  -0.71  (-46.82)***  -0.71  (-22.53)***  -0.71  (-47.05)*** 
DENSITY  -0.10  (-10.95)***  -0.10  (-4.33)***  -0.10  (-11.06)*** 
SHARE_PH  -0.22  (-0.97)        -0.22  (-2.00)**    -0.22  (-0.96)       
LANDLEVEL  0.070  (1.19)        0.070  (0.68)        0.073  (1.25)       
SIZE  -0.21  (-4.18)***  -0.21  (-3.52)***  -0.21  (-4.23)*** 
PUBLIC  0.11  (1.74)*      0.11  (1.82)*      0.12  (1.81)*     
AUCTION  0.28  (6.29)***  0.28  (4.68)***  0.27  (6.29)*** 
BIDDING  -0.17  (-3.31)***  -0.17  (-1.81)*      -0.17  (-3.32)*** 
LISTED  0.14  (4.33)***  0.14  (2.82)***  0.14  (4.37)*** 
City Dummies  YES  YES  NO 
Time Dummies  YES  YES  YES 
Developer Grade 
Dummies 
YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.99  0.99  - 
Notes: (1) Coefficients of city and time fixed effects are not show.    . 
(2) Number of observations is 3478.   
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Table 9.    Timing of C-SOE Developer Price Effect 
Sample is all land transactions from the first quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of 
2010  in  eight  major  cities,  as described in Table  4.    Dependant  variable  is  the 
natural  log  of  land  price  per  square  meter  of  permitted  housing  floor  area.   
STIMULUS is an indicator variable set to zero before the first quarter of 2009 and to 
one in that quarter and thereafter.    Other right-hand-side variables as defined in 
Table  5.    Numbers  in  parentheses  are  robust  t-ratios  adjusted  for  city-level 
clustering.   
 
    (1)  (2)  (2) 
CSOE  0.0908  (1.34)        0.0506  (0.83)        0.157  (2.79)*** 
CSOE interacted with:             
STIMULUS  0.196  (2.46)**    0.190  (2.50)**       
LSOE  0.117  (2.19)**        0.122  (2.33)**   
LSOE interacted with:             
STIMULUS  -0.00880  (-0.14)            -0.0290  (-0.49)       
log(D_CENTER)  -0.707  (-22.6)***  -0.709  (-22.7)***  -0.708  (-22.5)*** 
DENSITY  -0.104  (-4.35)***  -0.105  (-4.37)***  -0.104  (-4.33)*** 
SHARE_PH  -0.269  (-2.40)**    -0.266  (-2.51)**    -0.226  (-1.99)*     
LANDLEVEL  0.0698  (0.68)        0.0703  (0.68)        0.0692  (0.68)       
SIZE  -0.211  (-3.57)***  -0.197  (-3.24)***  -0.209  (-3.50)*** 
PUBLIC  0.120  (1.92)*      0.128  (2.06)**    0.116  (1.85)*     
AUCTION  0.274  (4.69)***  0.273  (4.63)***  0.275  (4.69)*** 
BIDDING  -0.167  (-1.78)*      -0.159  (-1.70)*      -0.170  (-1.81)*     
LISTED  0.141  (2.80)***  0.154  (3.13)***  0.142  (2.83)*** 
City Dummies  YES  YES  YES 
Time Dummies  YES  YES  YES 
Developer Grade 
Dummies 
YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.99  0.99  0.99 
Notes: (1) Coefficients of city and time fixed effects are not show.    . 
(2) Number of observations is 3478.   
(3) ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level;*: significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 10.  Importance of Connections Proxies to C-SOE Price Premium 
Sample is all land transactions from the first quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of 
2010  in  eight  major  cities,  as described in Table  4.    Dependant  variable  is  the 
natural  log  of  land  price  per  square  meter  of  permitted  housing  floor  area.   
STIMULUS is an indicator variable set to zero before the first quarter of 2009 and to 
one  in  that  quarter  and  thereafter.    As  proxies  for  the  likely  strength  of 
“connections” between the C-SOE's top executives and the authorities regulating 
real estate development, we include LOCAL, an indicator variable set to one if the 
land purchased is in the same city as the C-SOE's head office and to zero otherwise, 
and  log(DISTANCE),  the  logarithm  of  the  distance  in  kilometers  between  the 
C-SOE's head office and the city in which the land purchased is located.    Other 
right-hand-side  variables  as  defined  in  Table  5.    Numbers  in  parentheses  are 
robust t-ratios adjusted for city-level clustering.   
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
CSOE  0.0358  (0.52)  0.381  (4.12)***  0.0349  (0.52)  0.380  (4.13)*** 
CSOE interacted with:                 
LOCAL  0.314  (3.38)***      0.314  (3.36)***     
log(DISTANCE)      -0.0491 (-3.90)***      -0.0490 (-3.87)*** 
STIMULUS  0.182  (2.38)**  0.162  (2.13)**  0.185  (2.55)**  0.165  (2.26)** 
LSOE  0.121  (2.31)**  0.122  (2.32)**  0.117  (3.15)***  0.117  (3.16)*** 
LSOE interacted with:                 
STIMULUS  -0.0126  (-0.21)  -0.0130  (-0.22)         
log(D_CENTER)  -0.706  (-22.6)***  -0.706  (-22.6)***  -0.707  (-22.6)***  -0.706  (-22.7)*** 
DENSITY  -0.105  (-4.38)***  -0.105  (-4.40)***  -0.105  (-4.37)***  -0.105  (-4.40)*** 
SHARE_PH  -0.341  (-3.22)***  -0.344  (-3.25)***  -0.340  (-3.23)***  -0.343  (-3.26)*** 
LANDLEVEL  0.0678  (0.66)  0.0672  (0.66)  0.0681  (0.67)  0.0675  (0.66) 
SIZE  -0.208  (-3.56)***  -0.207  (-3.52)***  -0.209  (-3.59)***  -0.207  (-3.55)*** 
PUBLIC  0.115  (1.94)*  0.115  (1.93)*  0.114  (1.93)*  0.115  (1.92)* 
AUCTION  0.272  (4.66)***  0.272  (4.65)***  0.272  (4.67)***  0.272  (4.66)*** 
BIDDING  -0.171  (-1.85)*  -0.171  (-1.85)*  -0.170  (-1.87)*  -0.170  (-1.86)* 
LISTED  0.146  (2.90)***  0.146  (2.91)***  0.146  (2.90)***  0.146  (2.91)*** 
City Dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Time Dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Developer Grade 
Dummies 
YES  YES  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
Notes: (1) Coefficients of city and time fixed effects are not show.    . 
(2) Number of observations is 3478.   
(3) ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level;*: significant at the 10% level. 
 